Tibet Report

2.1 At the invitation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a

delegation of Parliamentarians undertook a visit to the Tibet

Autonomous Region (TAR). The invitation followed a series of

meetings in which Chinese Ministers and Chinese Tibetan

scholars were received in the House of Lords by Lords Alton

and Steel. Discussion at those meetings focused upon talks

between the Dalai Lama and PRC. Concerns about religious

liberty and human rights were also expressed.

2.2 The decision taken by the All Party Parliamentary China

Group to support and facilitate a delegation to Tibet, in order

to investigate the situation and report their findings, has the full

support of the All Party Group on Tibet (of which Lord Steel,

Lord Alton and James Gray are members) as well as the

blessing of the Dalai Lama.

2.3 The members of the delegation were:

o

o

o

o

2.5 The objectives of the trip were:

o

o

o

o

o

2.8 The delegation was grateful to have the opportunity to speak

with UK Foreign Office Minister of State, Ivan Lewis MP, via

teleconference whilst he was in Tibet and learn of his

observations shortly before our own departure. The

delegation welcomes the visit of a Government Minister as

evidence of the importance with which the UK Government

views the situation in Tibet. At the time of writing a follow-up

meeting with Mr. Lewis was scheduled to take place in mid-

October 2009.

2.9 Tibet has had a varied and relationship with China for many

centuries. However, the nature of this relationship has not

been consistent, alternating between periods of greater and

lesser autonomy.

2.10 The precise historical status of Tibet is a source of much

controversy, with contradictory assertions of historic

independence or incorporation. The PRC adamantly claims

that “Tibet has always been part of China”, whereas the

Tibetan ‘Government in Exile’ assert that “Tibet has always

been a sovereign state”. These rival claims, however,

overlook a more nuanced historical reality. Tibet was a part of

the Mongol and Manchu empires along with China and

Mongolia. At various times the Tibetans have recognised the

leading status of the Emperor of China as have the

Vietnamese, Koreans and others.

2.11 One preliminary difficulty is that of definition: what constitutes

Tibet? Neither its size nor population are simple matters of fact

due to various entities claiming differing parts of the area as a

Tibetan region. What is sometimes referred to as

‘ethnographic Tibet’ covers a much larger area than the

Tibetan Autonomous Region, including lands spreading out

extensively to the east, and there are those within the Tibetan

exile community who seek the restoration of this larger area as

a united Tibet. Indeed, the Dalai Lama maintains there are

"six million Tibetans." In 1950 it is thought that this figure

(which represents Tibetans living in the Tibet Autonomous

Region and the neighbouring Chinese provinces) was around

2.5 million. The figure of six million is said to comprise 2.5

million people in the Autonomous Region, 2.9 million people in

the neighbouring Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu,

Sichuan and Yunnan, along with 120,000 Diaspora Tibetans

living in exile. More Tibetans live in the counties of the

neighbouring provinces than Tibetans living within the

Autonomous Region. This led the Tibetan Government-in-

Exile to lay claim to all land on which Tibetans are living (2.5

million square kilometers), double the territorial size of the

Autonomous Region, and predominantly territory that was

never administered by the Lhasa Government, even during its

forty years of independence (although always under Tibetan

influence).

2.12 Although the discussion of Tibet’s history goes back many

centuries, a major short-term cause of the current position

occurred in 1949, when the People’s Liberation Army of the

PRC began the process of the “liberation” of Tibet. The

following year, in October 1950, Chinese troops took control of

the Eastern Tibetan region of Chamdo.

2.13 In 1951 Mao Zedong and the Dalai Lama concluded a 17-point

agreement on Tibet’s relationship with the PRC. It appeared to

ensure that Tibet would remain autonomous but with

responsibility for foreign affairs passing to China. The

legitimacy of the 17-point agreement was questioned by many,

who argued that the young Dalai Lama had been faced with

little choice but to sign.

2.14 During the 1950s, the government of the PRC began to take a

range of political, economic, social and cultural measures,

which had the effect of moving Tibet towards much greater

absorption within China. In essence, a class struggle involving

harsh subjection and oppression was perpetuated by the

Communists, leading to unrest and resistance against Chinese

rule. The disturbances spilled over into Tibet proper, leading

to a widespread Tibetan revolt in 1959. As a result, scores of

Chinese troops entered Tibet. The Dalai Lama and the

Tibetan Government fled into India, where they remain in

exile.

2.15 Tibet became one of China’s ‘Autonomous Regions’ in 1965.

For critics of Chinese rule, whether they favour Tibetan

independence or “meaningful autonomy”, Tibet has

been fully incorporated into the PRC. As the leader of the

Tibetan ‘Government in Exile’, His Holiness the Dalai Lama

leads those calling for “meaningful autonomy”.

2.16 During the early 1980s, in the post-Mao period, President

Deng Xiaoping made a genuine attempt at conciliation, when

he invited Tibetan exiles to return and offered direct

negotiations with the Dalai Lama and the right to visit Tibet. It

was in the words of the historian, Tsering Shakya, a decision

which was "badly misjudged": "Beijing's commitment had

underlined the involvement of Deng Xiaoping, China's

paramount leader, and of Hu Yaobang, the most senior Party

official. Once the Chinese leaders lost interest in the issue any

possibility of reaching a compromise was effectively ended."

2.17 Throughout the visit, we were mindful of Britain’s responsibility

for the role it has played in the shaping of Tibet's twentieth

century history. We were conscious of the deep and unhealed

historical barriers that can lie between peoples - for instance,

Britain's role in the Opium Wars or the effects of China's

Cultural Revolution - and the misunderstandings that can arise

as a result.

2.18 In 1903-04, at the instigation of Lord Curzon, the Indian

viceroy, and under the leadership of Sir Francis

Younghusband, a British military expedition invaded Tibet in

order to protect colonial interest in India. It was justified by "the

Great Game" of late Victorian and early Edwardian England -

curtailing Russian influence, creating a buffer state, clarifying

borders, imposing diplomatic relations, asserting British

influence. Despite 3,000 Tibetan soldiers being killed during

the campaign, the British believed that they were welcome

liberators. Lhasa's inhabitants greeted the British force with

clapping. In reality, in Tibetan culture the clapping gestures

were a hostile rebuke and an attempt to fend off the unwanted

effects of occupation - but on such misconceptions are

differing forms of history based.

2.19 Following the British invasion, the thirteenth Dalai Lama fled to

Mongolia. He returned after a treaty was concluded and the

withdrawal of the British force. In 1910, emulating the British,

the Chinese sent soldiers to Tibet, forcing the Dalai Lama into

exile once more. This time (as his successor would do fifty

years later) he went to India. He was befriended by Charles

Bell, a British official who spoke fluent Tibetan, who became a

trusted mentor spending a year in Lhasa ten years later.

2.20 Bell later wrote that he believed Tibet had been "clearly

independent" of China until 1720, and that it had reasserted

that independence in 1912 when the thirteenth Dalai Lama

expelled China's troops and proclaimed Tibet's freedom - a

tentative independence that lasted until October 1950 when

40,000 Chinese troops invaded Kham. The young fourteenth

Dalai Lama appealed to the United Nations describing the

invasion as "the grossest instance of the violation of the weak

by the strong."

2.21 Although Britain had entered treaty relations with Tibet its

representative on the Security Council, Gladwyn Jebb, told the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: "What we want to do is to

create a situation which does not oblige us in practice to do

anything about the Communist invasion of Tibet."

3.1 The chief aim of the visit was to explore opportunities for

dialogue between the Dalai Lama and China. Currently,

relations between China and His Holiness, The Dalai Lama

remain very poor. Talks between the Dalai Lama’s

representatives and Beijing have been suspended since

summer 2007. We are not aware of any current plans to

reopen the negotiations in the near future.

3.2 The delegation raised the prospect of resuming talks with the

Dalai Lama at every available opportunity with Chinese

officials. However, our pleas were met with a consistently

negative response on the part of the Chinese administration.

We were told by Mr, Zha Peixin, Chair of NPC China-UK

Friendship Group and Member NPC Standing Committee, that

the Dalai Lama was a “criminal of history” and a “separatist”.

In Tibet itself, during a meeting with the Tibetan Autonomous

Region Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission, in response

to questions as to why the image of the Dalai Lama was

prohibited, Mr. Phuntsok said that “no country would allow a

picture of such a criminal… He has never done anything for

the benefit of Tibet.”

3.3 We did not recognise this portrayal of the Dalai Lama who,

amongst other accolades, was made a Nobel Peace Prize

Laureate in 1989. The Dalai Lama holds moderate opinion

within the Tibetan Exile community. Inflammatory rhetoric is

destructive. In our view, the Dalai Lama is in fact a potential

ally of China; only he has the moral leadership to deliver a

settlement acceptable to the Tibetan people. The “Middle

Way” approach he has outlined of seeking "meaningful

autonomy", as opposed to full independence for Tibet, gives

an indication as to what such a settlement may look like.

3.4 The delegates were insistent that common ground should be

sought and can be found between the PRC and the Tibetan

‘Government in Exile’. Despite strong rhetoric on the part of

the Chinese, James Gray impressed upon Ministers an

argument of enlightened self-interest: resolution of this issue

would disproportionately serve to further China’s standing in

the world.

3.5 Lord Steel drew the analogy of the troubles in Northern Ireland

in a meeting with Mr. Zhu Weiqun, Vice Minister of the United

Front Work Department. In Northern Ireland the UK was faced

with a different set of circumstances but a comparable

impasse. Lord Steel pointed out to Mr. Weiqun the

extraordinary measures the UK Government took in reaching

the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, including the creation of

a devolved assembly, the release of prisoners, and speaking

with leaders of dissident groups who may otherwise have

been regarded as criminals. As the first Speaker of the

Scottish Parliament, Lord Steel presented the example of the

UK models of devolution, an attempt to reconcile both unity

and an advanced level of autonomy. We believe that the

Chinese Government should explore the models of devolution

in the UK.

3.6 Reflecting further upon the Northern Ireland analogy, Derek

Wyatt provided further examples of South Africa, Sri Lanka,

and the Middle East where intractable stand-offs were traded

for peace talks, involving considerable sacrifice and political

loss of face in pursuit of a greater hope. China’s own

precedent of Hong Kong and the “one country, two systems”

approach adopted, was cited by the delegation as an instance

of a flexible and creative way of resolving a difficult political

situation. In addition, it was suggested to Mr. Weiqun that an

independent interlocutor, akin to the role played by Senator

Mitchell in Northern Ireland, may help to facilitate and focus

discussion on the issues.

3.7 In the aftermath of the March 2008 riots, the Dalai Lama

trenchantly condemned violence as a means of procuring

change in Tibet. He has also accepted (as the British

Government did earlier this year, although without any

parliamentary debate) that Tibet is part of China - but believes

that it should be allowed significant autonomy. He has

repudiated any return to feudalism and stated that he is willing

to accept a spiritual role, rather than a political one. With

sufficient goodwill and determination on both sides, these four

principles could form the basis of a firm settlement with the

government of the PRC.

3.8 How China deals with the Dalai Lama and adherents of his

faith will be a test of their statecraft. The Dalai Lama may be

seen as a political problem but this is to ignore his role as one

of the world's foremost spiritual leaders. Lord Alton proposed

that consideration be given to the making of a religious

Concordat with the Dalai Lama, which might designate Lhasa

as a holy city, comparable to the standing enjoyed by the

Pope and the Holy See in Vatican City within Italy.

3.9 Both sides want peace as well as a prosperous, bright future

for Tibet. That future will only be achieved if both sides work

together. Moreover, without co-operation there remains a

serious risk of working at cross-purposes, giving rise to an

escalation of hostility, and violence. Dialogue represents the

best hope of averting that course.

4.1 Concerns over religious liberty were foremost amongst the

matters upon which the delegation pressed representatives of

the PRC. Religion, especially Buddhism, is a fundamental

part of Tibetan culture. In a meeting at the headquarters of

Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission of Tibet Autonomous

Region, we were told that there were over 1,700 religious

venues in Tibet. We were deeply struck by the popular piety of

the Tibetan people and the relative freedom in which they

were able to practice their faith. Any attempts to resolve the

political situation in Tibet must take due account is of the

profound spiritual life of Tibetan people.

4.2 Religious liberty is guaranteed by international law, specifically

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Mr.

Sonam Rinzen of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission

of Tibet Autonomous Region told the delegation how domestic

law also affords legal protection for religion in Article 36 of the

Constitution, which stipulates: “Citizens of the People’s

Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief”. This

represents significant progress since Mao Zedong’s

statement, in an encounter with the Dalai Lama in 1955, that

"religion is poison".

4.3 We welcomed the 700m RMB the Chinese government is

investing in the repair of the monasteries and improvement of

religious sites. Of course, much of this repair arises from the

damage caused by both neglect and destruction during the

Cultural Revolution.

4.4 However, despite this ostensible support for religious practice,

problems remain. The question of the freedom of religion in

Tibet is inextricably linked to the discussion of relations with

the Dalai Lama. In our view, where religious liberties are

enjoyed and conferred by the State, instead of undermining its

unity, the State invariably becomes the beneficiary of the

good, which that religion is then free to promote. In countries

such as the United States religious organisations provide an

engine for social, charitable, and voluntary endeavour. China

knows, through its own experience in Hong Kong, what an

important part free religious belief plays in the make-up of its

character.

4.5 Where, on the other hand, a religion and its leaders are

vilified, imprisoned, regulated, or driven under-ground, it turns

the adherents of that faith into enemies of the State. The

younger generation of believers, especially, are invariably

alienated and radicalised. Their grievance becomes a

4.7 There are 46,000 Tibetan monks or nuns in Tibet and the

overwhelming majority of Tibetans are adherents to the

Buddhist way of life. We were privileged to visit several

monasteries during our trip, including the Drepung Monastery

– the home monastery of the Dalai Lama, Sera Monastery,

and Samye Monastery - the first monastery in Tibet. By their

very nature, the monasteries were peaceful places of prayer

and the monks greeted us warmly.

4.8 We were told by Mr. Sibpa about the role that the Tibetan

Buddhist Association plays as a bridge between the the

government of the PRC and the Buddhist population of Tibet.

The organisation has facilitated the visit of over 10,000

Buddhists from overseas to visit Buddhist sites in Tibet. We

welcome the ability of pilgrims to visit holy sites in Tibet.

4.9 On one of our own visits, at Drepung Monastery, we followed

up on the questions previously posed by Minister of State Ivan

Lewis MP concerning the disappearance of 400 monks

following the unrest in March 2008. Our guide, a monk, told

us that there were 6 monks missing who had participated in

the demonstrations. When questioned on the numbers of

monks at the monastery, he said that there were about 500

monks registered before the protests and 500 monks

registered after. He said he did not know the 6 missing

monks, and didn’t know any other monks at the monastery

who knew them.

4.10 We were left to assume that the monks who disappeared may

not have been formally registered at Drepung (though still

resident) and/or the unwillingness to disclose further

information arose out of a fear of the consequences that may

result from revealing disappearances to visitors such as

ourselves.

4.11 The governance of monasteries was also questioned. We

learned that each monastery has a Management Committee

upon which Communist party officials sit, together with some

selected monks from the monastery. These committees are

responsible for the administrative affairs of the monastery

including finance, recruitment and building work, but also had

the capacity to adjudicate upon more religious matters, such

as the appointment of the Abbot of the monastery. The

spiritual ambit of these compulsory Management Committees

struck us an unnecessary encroachment upon the integrity of

the monasteries.

4.12 We were further concerned about restrictions on the extent to

which religious expression is permitted and the “patriotic reeducation”

aimed at qualifying religious belief. For example,

photographs of the Dalai Lama are illegal in Tibet and people

are forced to denounce him as a spiritual leader. We deeply

regret these measures and hope that the government of the

PRC will move to a position where it accepts the Dalai Lama’s

religious role and where monasteries are able to display his

image without the reproach of severe criminal charges. Lord

Steel spoke of the parallel with this policy and the UK

Government’s former policy of banning Martin McGuiness

from the television and radio. Martin McGuiness is currently

the Deputy First Minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

4.13 There are four mosques in the Tibetan Autonomous Region,

two of which are located within Lhasa, and there are

approximately 4,000 to 5,000 Muslims registered in Tibet, a

figure which excludes recent migrants.

4.14 Though we visited no mosque within the Tibetan Autonomous

Region, we were fortunate to go to The Great Mosque of

Xining, the Dongguan Masjid Mosque. It is one the four largest

mosques in Northwest China and is the largest and most

important mosque in Qinghai Province. The mosque dates

from the 14

4.16 We were told that the number of Christians in Tibet is relatively

small. Only one Church exists: a Catholic church with around

700 parishioners, located in the community of Yanjing in the

East of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Lord Steel and Lord

Alton presented some religious books as gifts to be given to

that community, which Mr. Sonam Rinzen, a local official,

undertook to pass on to them.

5.1 We welcome the progress that China has made in protecting

and promoting universal human rights, guaranteed under

international law. Among a long list of improvements, the

scope of freedom of expression has increased, and living

standards have improved amongst a broad stratum of the

citizenry. The government of the PRC has even sanctioned

human rights education for law students. On repeated

occasions Chinese officials were keen to impress upon us

China’s strong commitment to human rights norms.

5.2 Mr. Zha Peixin of the National People’s Congress told us how

in 2004 the constitution was amended to recognise the

expression ‘human rights’. He further explained that China

was “willing to learn from other countries. In a separate

meeting after the official programme of the delegation, Lord

Alton was told by Dr. Shen Yongxiang, the Minister

responsible for the UK-China dialogue on human rights, that

he had been given a mandate to “deepen and extend human

rights”.

5.3 Several factors have determined this positive trajectory away

from the wanton brutality of Mao’s regime and the Tiananmen

Square massacre. Foremost amongst them is China’s view,

rightly held, that compliance with international human rights

standards as necessary to maintain a sense of legitimacy on

the world stage and amongst a domestic population

increasingly informed about human rights.

5.4 However, NGO reports and local intelligence paint a radically

different picture. Persistent and tragic abuses alleged include:

the use of torture; the widespread use of the death penalty;

disappearances of political dissidents; abuses of reproductive

rights - including forced sterilisation and abortion. Other

instances reported include restrictions on the freedoms of

assembly; freedom of religion (see above); censorship,

including stringent curbs on access to internet sites; and

discrimination on the basis of health status, party membership

and social origin.

5.5 Of particular note, the reprisals following the March 2008

demonstrations across the Tibet Autonomous Region and

beyond are deeply troubling and we expressed our concern on

several occasions. We recognise the difficulty facing law

enforcement agencies at that time in dealing with the situation

of mass demonstrations where criminal acts were taking

place. Alleged offences included assaulting police officers,

criminal damage and arson. In our view, the use of violence by

demonstrators serves to undermine their cause, not advance

it. However, we share the concerns expressed by Human

Rights Watch and others that such offences may have been

used as a way of repressing political dissent.

5.6 Lord Alton, following up on cases raised by Mr. Ivan Lewis,

made a personal appeal for clemency in 3 specific cases.

5.7 The first case raised was that of Mr. Wangdu, a Tibetan public

health worker, who was sentenced to life imprisonment by the

Lhasa City Intermediary People’s Court for allegedly

forwarding information to people outside Tibet.

5.8 Lord Alton also raised the cases of Lobsang Gyaltsen and

Loyak who were sentenced to death with no reprieve on April

8 2009 by the Lhasa Intermediate People’s Court. They had

been found guilty of arson attacks in Lhasa on 14

5.12

5.13

6.1 The economic and social development of Tibet in recent years

has been considerable. We were able to see the vast

progress which has been made in recent years.

6.2 We were told that in one year alone (2006-07), GDP had

increased by 14% (34.219 billion RMB) and that the local

economy was thriving, thanks, in part, to investment from the

national government. This has had a decided impact upon

living conditions of Tibetans, especially in the countryside.

172,000 households from the rural population have been

moved into reliable and comfortable homes with running

water, electricity and sanitation.

6.3 We visited Chenba village, in Rong Township, Sangri County

and saw first hand the excellent new homes constructed by

the government. Ms. Lhamu, Head of Chenba village proudly

showed us around the village hall and her home. She

explained how they maintain their traditional way of life as

farmers, whilst enjoying the benefits of modern amenities.

Their children are able to go to school in the neighbouring

village.

6.4 We were told of the progress that has been made in primary

and secondary education, higher education, and vocational

education. The government invested 3.276 billion RMB in the

development of the education undertaking in 2007, an

increase of 22.34% over the previous year. This increased

investment was used primarily to increase provision of rural

compulsory education, as well as for textbooks for students in

more urban settings and purchase teaching equipment for

elementary and junior schools.

6.5 In Tibet there are 884 elementary schools, 117 regular high

schools and 10 secondary vocational schools; in addition to

six institutions of higher learning, including Tibet University -

which we were able to visit. The new Lhasa campus of the

Tibet University was completed in 2007 at a cost of 500m

RMB, and accommodates 8000 students. In our view such

capital investment demonstrated an important commitment to

education in the Tibet.

6.6 We were struck by the efforts being made by the central and

regional governments to preserve Tibetan culture. On our

visits to Tibet University, the Museum of Tibetan Medicine and

Culture in Xining, and the Tibet Museum in Lhasa we saw firsthand

the extent to which Tibetan culture was valued and

preserved.

6.7 Derek Wyatt raised the prospect of developing links between

these institutions and the British Library in order to further

enhance the availability of the vast Tibetan scriptures, raising

the possibility of digitising the books. Lord Steel expressed a

desire to see the sharing of resources between the scholars

and collection in Dharamsala and those in Tibet. We hope that

shared, mutual interest in the preservation of Tibetan culture

between Tibetans in Tibet itself and the diaspora community

can form the basis of collaborative projects

6.8 In a visit to Lalu Wetland Reserve, an area covering 12.2

square kilometres, we observed the importance attached to

environmental conservation. James Gray praised the efforts

being made to conserve the rich and unique, though fragile,

ecosystem in Lhasa. Lalu Wetland Reserve is the highest and

largest of its kind anywhere in China and its core area covers

11.5% of the city.

6.9 We firmly hope that in the face of the pressures associated

with economic development, these efforts continue and are

extended.

7.1 The Foreign Secretary issued a Written Ministerial Statement

on 29 October 2008 recognising Tibet as part of China and

recognising Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. This brought the

UK’s policy in line with other EU member states, the US and

the Dalai Lama himself. It is argued by the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office that the previous policy which

considered Tibet to be autonomous but recognised the

‘special position’ of the Chinese authorities there, clouded our

ability to get our human rights concerns across. We support

the Foreign Secretary’s position as a reasonable and sensible

move. Needless to say, the Chinese ministers to whom we

spoke were very pleased by the change.

7.2 However, we believe that the way in which this momentous

announcement was made, by Written Ministerial Statement,

was wrong. The matter should have been the subject of an

oral statement before the House of Commons and House of

Lords, with the opportunity for the Minister to clarify the

Government’s position. In not allowing debate on the issue,

the Foreign Office has exercised poor judgment, which has led

to misunderstanding on the part of non-governmental

organisations and Tibetan exiles who feel betrayed by the

recent decision.

7.3 We further believe that the apparent lack of a “quid pro quo”

for the change in the UK’s position was an error. The change

of position could have been used as a bargaining tool to

reopen the dialogue between the China and the Dalai Lama.

It appears as though the long-term situation in Tibet achieved

little discernable benefit in the UK’s change of policy.

7.4 We welcome, however, the visit of Minister of State Ivan Lewis

MP to Tibet in September, and look forward to sharing our

observations with him. It is noteworthy that Mr. Lewis, and our

own delegation, were permitted to enter Tibet given that recent

requests for travel visas by the Ambassadors of France,

Germany and the United States, have, along with requests

from the international media, all been refused.

8.1 We were grateful recipients of Chinese hospitality (see

acknowledgments). The cost of internal travel, meals and

accommodation was met by the government of the PRC. The

cost of return flights to Beijing was met by the All Party

Parliamentary China Group, with incidental costs met by

individual members of the delegation.

8.2 Members of the delegation were mindful of the controversy

surrounding the rail link between Xining and Lhasa upon which

they travelled to Tibet. However, the internal travel

arrangements were made for us by our hosts and it would

have been inappropriate in the circumstances to insist on an

alternative mode of transport. Furthermore, we felt that it was

important to assess the impact of the railway and we were

persuaded that the best way of doing so was to experience it.

We were grateful recipients of a gracious welcome wherever we went.

The delegation would like to thank for their assistance and hospitality:

Prof. Zhao Yongren: Parliamentary Counsellor, Chinese Embassy in

London

Ms. Kesang Dekyi

Mr. Zhang Lizhung

Mr. Sonam Rinzen

Mr. Nima Ciren

Deji Yangzong

Mima Lamo

Mr Tseba

Mr. Hu Hu Xinsheng

Mr. Tsering Phuntsok

Ms. Lhamu

Mr. Tashi

Mr. Nyima Tsering

Sir William Ehrman

Lady Ehrman

The Monks of Potala Palace

The Monks of Jokang Temple

The Monks of Drepung Monastery

The Monks of Samye Monastery

The Monks of Sera Monastery

AM: Arrival

PM: Meeting with Zha Peixin (Chair of NPC China-UK Friendship

Group, Member NPC Standing Committee, Former Chinese

Ambassador to UK)

Visit to the Tibet Research Centre

AM: Flight from Beijing to Xining

PM: Hosted by the Xining Overseas Friendship Group; visited

Dongguan Masjid Mosque, Ta’er Monastery, Tibetan Medicine

Museum of China.

Departure by train to Lhasa

AM: Visit to Potala Palace and Jokang Temple

PM: Visit to Drepung Monastery and Tibet University

Dinner hosted by Mr. Sonam Rinzen, Deputy Secretary General

of the Association of the Protection and Development of Tibetan

Culture

AM: Meeting at the Headquarters of Ethnic and Religious Affairs

Commission of Tibet Autonomous Region

Visit to the Norbulinka

PM: Visit to Lalu Wetland Reserve, Sera Monastery, Tibet Museum

Meeting with Mr. Nima Ciren, Vice-President of the Standing

Committee of the People’s Congress of the TAR

AM: Travel to Zedang town, Shannan Prefecture

Visit to Chenba village, Rong Township, Sangri County

PM: Visit to Samye Monastery

Dinner hosted by Mr. Nyima Tsering, Deputy Commissioner of

Shannan Prefecture

AM: Flight from Lhasa to Beijing

PM: Meeting with Mr Zhu Weiqun, Vice Minister of the United Front

Work Department

PM: Meeting with HM Ambassador to People’s Republic of China, Sir

William Ehrman, and Lady Ehrman

The

For more information, please contact:

Office of Ben Chapman MP

House of Commons

Westminster

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